The proceedings under the Rent Act is of summary nature wherein the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is to be taken note of to the extent it is required for considering such eviction petition and the rigour of examining the ownership ought not to be indulged in the manner as is done in a title suit unless the respondent sets up title to the very rented property which is adverse to that of the landlord. Santosh Chaturvedi v. Kailash Chandra, (2020) 16 SCC 672.
Tag Archives: Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
Validity of Notice Under Section 30 of – Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act
In Dr. Babu Ram Sharma v. IVth Additional Judge, Saharanpur and others, (2006) 2 ARC 239 and Noor Mohd. and another v. IVth Additional District Judge , Kanpur Nagar and others, (2006) 1 ARC 550, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court again took the view that when the entire rent due till the date of notice had already been validly deposited under Section 30 of the Act, the notice of demand is bad in law, and therefore, since at the time of notice, tenants were not defaulter in payment of rent for four months or more, the suit filed on the ground of default was liable to be dismissed. It was held that the suit for eviction was not maintainable as at the time of notice, the tenant was not defaulter since he had already validly deposited the rent under section 30 of the Act. It was further held that under the circumstances, the suit was not maintainable under section 20(2) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of (Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The default contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) should be in regard to rent for a period of not less than four months. The provision does not say that even if the tenant is in arrears of rent for less than four months he would be liable to be evicted under it on the mere ground that default had continued for more than four months. Even Notice of demand will be invalid and could not be considered to be a notice of demand under the said provision if the tenant was not in arrears of rent for more than four months. Nand Lal Keshari v. Shashi Bhushan Agarwal, 2020 (2) AWC 1787.
If a release application is filed under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for bona fide need of the landlord himself or any member of his family, it may stand frustrated because of some subsequent event and the same is rejected, however, subsequently, because of subsequent event, like need of other family members, who may now have become eligible/competent to carry on business or in case of residential building more accommodation is required because of increase in family etc., etc., or of the landlord himself because of any subsequent event like his retirement etc., which have taken place after rejection of his earlier release application, it cannot be said that the subsequent release application would not be maintainable as again it would be a different cause of action and if held otherwise, it would again frustrate the intention of the law. Lalit Kumar Upreti v. Chunni Lal Gujral, 2018 (4) AWC 3693.
‘Tenant at sufferance’ is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after termination of term or expiry of lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is on who wrongfully continues in possession after extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. A “tenancy at sufferance” does not create relationship of landlord and tenant.
Moreover, even possession of lessee after determination of lease or expiry of period of lease becomes that of “Tenant at Sufferance”, therefore, even a quit notice is not necessary to be given and Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not at all attracted. Relying on earlier decision in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P., (1995) 5 SCC 698, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sevoke Properties Ltd. v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd., AIR 2019 SC 2664 held that once it is admitted by lessee that term of lease has expired, lease stood determined by efflux of time and in such a case, a quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property is not required to be given. It was held as under:
“Once the lease stood determined by efflux of time, there was no necessity for a notice of termination under Section 106.” Lov Mandeshwari Saran Singh v. State of U.P., 2020 (138) ALR 845.
The first proviso to Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provides that where the building was in occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of the Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in Clause (a), unless a period of 3 years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years. Smt. Meena Begum v. Additional District Judge, 2018 (127) ALR 358.
In Faruk Ilahi Tamboli v. B. S. Shankarrao Kokate, 2016 (1) ARC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it certainly cannot be the claim at the behest of a tenant, that the owner of a premises must continue in business with his parents or relations, assuming there was a joint business activity, to start with. That is usual, assuming there was a joint business activity, to start with. That is usual, and happens all the time when children come of age. And thereafter, they must have the choice to run their own life, by earning their own livelihood. The property owner has the right to use his property as he chooses, for running his business. There could be no irregularity if owner of the property chooses to use his property as he chooses, for running his business, independent of the business of other family members. In Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja, 2014 (2) ARC 265, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him for the purpose of his business. Even if the landlord is doing business from various other premises, it cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted presmises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business. Hari Shanker v. Om Prakash, 2018 (127) ALR 589.
In Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 683, a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the question – whether the rule of heritability extends to a statutory tenancy of commercial premises as much as it did to residential premises under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The Court while holding this in the affirmative discussed the concept of statutory tenant and held thus:
“”Statutory tenant” is not an expression to be found in any provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 or the rent control legislation of any other State. It is an expression coined by the Judges in England and, like many other concepts in English law, it has been imported into the jurisprudence of this country and has become an expression of common use to denote a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined but who is continuing in possession of the premises by virtue of the protection against eviction afforded to him by the rent control legislation. Though the expression “statutory tenant” has not been used in any rent control legislation the concept of statutory tenant finds recognition in almost every rent control legislation.…
It is also important to note that notwithstanding the termination of the contractual tenancy by the landlord, the tenant is afforded protection against eviction and is permitted to continue to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy by the Act in question and invariably by all the Rent Acts in force in various States so long as an order or decree for eviction against the tenant on any of the grounds specified in such Acts on the basis of which an order or decree for eviction against the tenant can be passed, is not passed.
The termination of the contractual tenancy in view of the definition of tenant in the Act does not bring about any change in the status and legal position of the tenant, unless there are contrary provisions in the Act; and, the tenant notwithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or estate which the tenant under the Act despite termination of the contractual tenancy continues to enjoy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary.”
In Krishna Prosad Bose v. Sarajubala Dassi , AIR 1961 Cal 505, it was held as under: “The Rent Control and the Tenancy Acts create a special world of their own. They speak of life after death. The statutory tenancy arises phoenix-like out of the ashes of the contractual tenancy. The contractual tenant may die but the statutory tenant may live long thereafter. The statutory tenant is an ex-tenant and yet he is a tenant.” R.S. Grewal v. Chander Parkash Soni, (2019) 6 SCC 216.
In the case of Sumitra Devi vs. Sampuran Singh (2011) 3 SCC 556, which has been relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, this Court has held that “it will all depend on the facts of each case whether the presumption of service of notice sent under postal certificate should be drawn. It is true that as observed by the Privy Council in its above referred judgment, the presumption would apply with greater force to letters which are sent by registered post, yet, when facts so justify, such presumption is expected to be drawn even in the case of a letter sent under postal certificate.” Considering the facts and circumstances of that case, this Court held the notice sent under certificate of posting to be sufficient service. In the case of Ranju vs. Rekha Ghosh (2007) 14 SCC 81, this court was considering a case where one month’s notice was to be given to the tenant for eviction. After considering the provisions of the relevant Tenancy Act, Transfer of Property Act and the Bengal General Clauses Act, it was held that “clause (6) provides mere “one month’s notice”; in such event, the said notice can be served in any manner and it cannot be claimed that the same should be served only by registered post with acknowledgement due.” In the facts of that case, it was held that service of notice sent under certificate of posting was sufficient. Similar is the case at hand, where the Act provides for that ‘the landlord has given a notice…’, without specifying the mode of such notice, and in the facts of the present case, notice sent under postal certificate has rightly been held to be proper service. While considering a case of service of notice under the Companies Act, this Court, in the case of V.S. Krishnan vs. Westfort HiTech Hospitals (2008) 3 SCC 363, has held that service of notice sent under certificate of posting would be sufficient where “there are materials to show that notices were sent, the burden is on the addressee to rebut the statutory presumption.”
From the perusal of the aforesaid Proviso to the Section 21(1) (b) of Uttar Pradesh (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, it is clear that no particular mode of giving notice by the landlord to the tenant has been provided for, meaning thereby that the same could be given orally or in writing; and if in writing, it is not necessary that it should be sent only by registered post. What is required is that “the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant”. Mohd. Asif Naseer v. West Watch Company, Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 2020 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 29649 of 2016).
From a bare perusal of the definition of “building” in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, it is clear that unless the context otherwise requires, “building” means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out houses, appurtenant to such building; any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building and any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah, (1996) 6 SCC 342 a structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls and usually but not necessarily, covered with a roof is a building. Roof is not necessary and indispensable adjunct for a building because there can be roofless buildings. The “building” as defined in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out-houses, appurtenant to such building. Therefore, an open land including any garden, garages and out-houses, appurtenant to a roofed structure for its beneficial enjoyment shall be a building within the meaning of Section 3(i) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Munnu Yadavi v. Ram Kumar Yadav, 2020 (138) ALR 70.