Observing that in a suit for declaration of title, the respondent-plaintiffs are to succeed only on the strength of their own title irrespective of whether the appellants-defendants have proved their case or not, in Union of India v. Vasavi Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269, it was held as under: “It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff.” Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath, (2019) 6 SCC 82.
Tag Archives: Second Appeal
A revision petition has a narrower scope than an “appeal”. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC, the dictinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” was discussed as follows:
“Appeal” and “revision” are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the distinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice.”
In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 it was held that:
“Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute.” Ordinarily, the power of revision can be exercised only when illegality, irrationality, or impropriety is found in the decision making process of the for a below. Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani. (2019) 6 SCC 424
In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered what the phrase “substantial question of law” means as under:
“The phrase is not defined in the CivilProcedure Code. The word “substantial”, as qualifying question of law, means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable.It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substances or consequence, or academic merely.”
A full bench of the Hon’ble Madras HighCourt in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, AIR 1951 Mad 969 observed as under:
“When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion or where the court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss an alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand, if the question was practically covered by decision of highest court or if general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of case, it could not be a substantial question of law.”
It was further observed in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 as under:
“A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the substantial findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. I twill, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” Ajay Kumar Jaiswal v. Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, 2018 (130) ALR408.