revision petition has a narrower scope than an “appeal”. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC, the dictinction
between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” was discussed as
“revision” are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the
distinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” is
well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves
a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved
person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance
has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure,
and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional
jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be
exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of
revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction.
The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of
keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of
their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure
established by law and according to well defined principles of justice.”
In Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 it
was held that:
jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa.
Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of
statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or
revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the
case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the
trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and
law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides
for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction,
though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated
with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not
continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional
court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the
permissible parameters provided in the statute.”
Ordinarily, the power of revision can be exercised only when illegality,
irrationality, or impropriety is found in the decision making process of the for
a below. Karnataka Housing Board v.
K.A. Nagamani. (2019) 6 SCC
The “doctrine of merger” is not a “doctrine of universal or unlimited application”. It is not that in every case where there are two orders, one by the inferior authority and the other by a superior authority, it is to be deemed that former had merged in the latter thereby losing its identity completely. The applicability of the doctrine of merger will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid. It will depend upon the subject matter of the appeal or revision or the scope of proceedings in which final orders are passed.
The same legal position has been laid down in the case of Kunhay Ahmed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359. The court referred to another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681, wherein it had held that the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and the applicability of the same are dependent upon the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute, the nature of the appeal or revisional order and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. State of U.P. v. Vivekanand Singh, 2015 (4) AWC 4130.
There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the Court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43. In that very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In that very case, this Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction. Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460.