Tag Archives: revision

Appellate Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Revisional Jursidiction

A revision petition has a narrower scope than an “appeal”. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC, the dictinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” was discussed as follows:

        “Appeal” and “revision” are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the distinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice.”

        In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.  v.  Dilbahar Singh  (2014) 9 SCC 78 it was held that:

“Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute.” Ordinarily, the power of revision can be exercised only when illegality, irrationality, or impropriety is found in the decision making process of the for a below. Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani. (2019) 6 SCC 424

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Doctrine of Merger

The “doctrine of merger” is not a “doctrine of universal or unlimited application”. It is not that in every case where there are two orders, one by the inferior authority and the other by a superior authority, it is to be deemed that former had merged in the latter thereby losing its identity completely. The applicability of the doctrine of merger will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid. It will depend upon the subject matter of the appeal or revision or the scope of proceedings in which final orders are passed.
The same legal position has been laid down in the case of Kunhay Ahmed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359. The court referred to another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681, wherein it had held that the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and the applicability of the same are dependent upon the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute, the nature of the appeal or revisional order and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. State of U.P. v. Vivekanand Singh, 2015 (4) AWC 4130.

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Comparison of Powers under Section 397 and 482 of Crpc

There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the Court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43. In that very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In that very case, this Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction. Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460.

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Orders Passed Under Section 145(1) and 146(1) Crpc – Maintainability of Revision under Section 397

Interlocutory Order
Halsbury’s Laws of England defines the term interlocutory Order as under:
“An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either:
(1) is made before judgment and gives no final decision on the matter in dispute but is merely on a matter of procedure or
(2) is made after judgment and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out s termed “interlocutory”. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.”
In Amar Nath and Others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1977 SC 2185, it was held as under:
“The term interlocutory order denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order.”
The word “interlocutory order” as defined in the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1997 Edition, is an order made pending the cause and before a final hearing is concluded on merits. Such an order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the litigation and generally collateral to the issues framed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment. It has been termed as a purely interim or temporary nature of an order which does not include the important rights and liabilities of the parties.
Intermediate Order
The word intermediate order as defined in the Law Lexicon is an order granted before entry of judgment, made between the commencement of an action and the final pronouncement. The word ‘Intermedium’ means between or in the middle. It is something intermediate in position or an intervening action or performance before the final conclusion. That which is situated or occurring between two things is intermediate. It holds the middle place or degree between two extremes interposed in between.
Interlocutory Order and Intermediate Order – Distinction Between
The distinction between the two would be that the former does not bring about any consequence of moment and is an aid in the performance of the final act. It does not affect any existing rights finally or to the disadvantage of either extremes. An intermediate order can touch upon the rights of the parties or be an order of moment so as to affect any of the rival parties or be an order of moment so as to affect any of the rival parties by its operation. Such an order affecting the rights of a person or tending to militate against either of the parties even at the subordinate stage can be termed as an intermediate or an intermediary order.
Final Order
The term “final order” means a decision finally affecting the rights of the contending parties. It is an issue which goes to the foundation of a trial and can never be questioned if it has been allowed to stand. It would therefore be final. The test of such finality would depend upon the facts of a case indicating termination of proceedings and ultimately affecting the fate of the parties. A final order is one which leaves nothing more to be decided by its own force.
The word ‘Final’ connotes that which comes at the end. It marks the last stage of a process leaving nothing to be looked for or expected. It is something ultimate in nature. It puts an end to something or in other words, it brings to a close any strife or uncertainty. It is the conclusion of an event, that which comes last. It connotes the finishing of some act and completion of some beginning. It does not allow the inclusion of anything or something that might be possible thereafter. A decisive stroke that cannot be reversed or altered is final.
Maintainability of Revision
Thus it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each separate individual case where the revising authority will have to examine as to whether the Magistrate has proceeded to exercise his judicious discretion well within his jurisdiction or has travelled beyond the same, keeping in view the various shades of litigation in such matters where the Apex Court and the High Court has held that an intermediate order, which is not necessarily an interlocutory order, could be subjected to revision. An order not conclusive of the main dispute, but conclusive of the subordinate matters with which it deals is not a purely interlocutory order even though it may not finally adjudicate the main dispute between the parties. Therefore a revision would not be barred under sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Code if the orders impugned before the revising authority fall within the tests indicated above. It was further held that orders under Section 145(1) and 146(1) of the Code are not in every circumstance, orders simplicitor, and therefore a revision would be maintainable depending upon the facts involved in each case. Munna Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (2012) 1 UPLBEC 1 (Full Bench).

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