The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in Landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. Boorugu Mahadev and Sons v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao, (2016) 3 SCC 343.
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“Ownership” denotes the relation between a person and an object forming the subject matter of his ownership. It consists in a complex of rights, all of which are rights in rem, being good against all the world and not merely against specific persons” (Salmon on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed.). There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoy the thing owned, and a right to consume, destroy or alienate it. Such a right may be indeterminate in duration and residuary in character. A person has a right to possess the thing which he owns, even when he is not in possession, but only retains a reversionary interest, i.e., a right to repossess the thing on the termination of a certain period or on the happening of a certain event. Suneel Galgotia v. State of U.P., 2016 (92) ACC 40.
A reading of the definition of ‘criminal intimidation’ would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation or property of the person threatened or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423.
As per the Contract Act, 1872, it is clearly stated that for an agreement to become a contract, the parties must be competent to contract, wherein age of majority is a condition for competency. A deed of mortgage is a contract and it cannot be held that a mortgage in the name of a minor is valid, simply because it in the interest of the minor unless he/she is represented by her natural guardian or guardian appointed by the Court. The law cannot be read differently for a minor who is a mortgagor and a minor who is a mortgagee as there are rights and liabilities in respect of the immovable property would flow out of such a contract on both of them. Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary, (2015) 5 SCC 622.
A perusal of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts:
(a) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security – the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.
(b) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary.
(c) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.
(d) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.
(e) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnized.
(f) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.
Probate of a will is not necessary outside the presidency towns of Bengal, Bombay and Madras as has been held in Bhaiya Ji v. Jageshwar Dayal Bajpai, AIR 1978 All 268 and Smt. Pitmo v. Shyam Singh, 1978 (4) ALR 173. The said decisions hold that a probate is not required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a Will regarding immovable properties in territories other than Bengal, Bombay and Madras. Thus, probate of will is not mandatory in respect of a Will concerning properties situate in the State of U.P. Ramjas (Dead) through LRs v. Smt. Sunder Devi (Dead) and another, 2014 (125) RD 376.
Lease and Mortgage are species of the same genus viz., the ‘transfer of property’. Both of them bring about transfer of property, but with a substantial change as to the nature of disposition. The principal objective of a mortgage is to provide security for repayment of amount, whereas the one under lease is that the owner of an item of immovable property permits another to use it on payment of rent. Except in the case of usufructuary mortgage and mortgage through conditional sale, the possession of the property continues to be with the mortgagor.
In the case of lease, the transferee invariably gets the possession of the property. Apart from the broad difference, there are certain minute important aspects, that differentiate the mortgage from lease. Once a transaction of mortgage is brought about, the mortgagor gets the right to redeem and the mortgagee gets the corresponding tight to foreclose the mortgage. The nature of decree to be passed in a suit for foreclosure of mortgage differs substantially from the one to be passed in a suit for recovery of possession of property from a lessee. A preliminary decree is to be passed and it is followed by final decree. Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 confers rights and places obligations on the mortgagors, on the one hand, and mortgagees, on the other hand, which are typical and germatone to such transactions. Prescription of any fixed term is alien to mortgages.
Lease, on the other hand, involves, just the permission being accorded by an owner of property, to another, to use it. The consideration therefor is the rent fixed with the consent of the parties. In a given case, the lease may be nominal or phenomenal. Further law does not prohibit the rent being paid in the form of adjustment from the amount due from the lessor to the lessee. What becomes important is the objective underlying the transaction, namely use of the property belonging to the lessor by the lessee, on payment of rent and for a stipulated term. Chapter V of the Act enlists the rights, which a lessor has against the lessee and vice versa. Termination of lease on the one hand, and foreclosure/redemption of mortgage, on the other hand, have nothing in common. When such is the radical difference between the two transactions, it is not at all possible to take the one for the other. Gita Cotton Trading Company v. CCRA, Hyderabad and another, 2013(121) RD 661 (AP).