Tag Archives: Notice for Dishonour of Cheque

Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 139 – Rebuttable Presumption

Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable preumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

        To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

        It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a pervasive burden.

        It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.  Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418.

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Dishonour of Cheque – Company to be Arraigned As Accused

In N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas [N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663 adverting to the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:

“Obviously such complaints must contain the factual allegations constituting each of the ingredients of the offence under Section 138. Those ingredients are: (1) that a person drew a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker; (2) that such a cheque when presented to the bank is returned by the bank unpaid; (3) that such a cheque was presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (4) that the payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the cheque the payment of the amount of money due under the cheque to payee; and (5) such a notice of payment is made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid.”

The provisions of Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished.

In the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused. Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy, (2019) 3 SCC 797.

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Filed under Company to be Arraigned, Dishonour of Cheque