In Union of India v. A.K. Pandey, (2009) 10 SCC 552 it was held as under:
“The principle seems to be fairly well-settled that prohibitive or negative words are ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision; although not conclusive. The court has to examine carefully the purpose of such provision and the consequences that may follow from non-observance thereof. If the context does not show nor demands otherwise, the text of a statutory provision couched in a negative form ordinarily has to be read in the form of command. When the word “shall” is followed by prohibitive or negative words, the legislative intention of making the provision absolute, peremptory and imperative becomes loud and clear and ordinarily has to be inferred as such. There being nothing in the context otherwise, in our judgment, there has to be clear ninety-six hours’ interval between the accused being charged for which he is to be tried and his arraignment and interval time in Rule 34 must be read as absolute. There is a purpose behind this provision: that purpose is that before the accused is called upon for trial, he must be given adequate time to give a cool thought to the charge or charges for which he is to be tried, decide about his defence and ask the authorities, if necessary, to take reasonable steps in procuring the attendance of his witnesses. He may even decide not to defend the charge(s) but before he decides his line of action, he must be given clear ninety-six hours.” Bijay Kumar Singh v. Amit Kumar Chamariya, (2019) 10 SCC 660.
In the case of Hansraj Gordhandas v. CCE and Customs, AIR 1970 SC 755 : (1969) 2 SCR 253, it was held as under:
“It was contented on behalf of the respondent that the object of granting exemption was to encourage the formation of cooperative societies which not only produced cotton fabrics but which also consisted of members, not only owning but having actually operated not more than four power-looms during the three years immediately preceding their having joined the society. The policy was that instead of each such member operating his looms on his own, he should combine with others by forming a society which, through the cooperative effort should produce cloth. The intention was that the goods produced for which exemption could be claimed must be goods produced on his own behalf by the society. On a true construction of the language of the Notifications dated 31.07.1959 and 30.04.1960 it is clear that all that is required for claiming exemption is that the cotton fabrics must be produced on power looms owned by the cooperative society. There is no further requirement under the two notifications that the cotton fabrics must be produced by the cooperative society on the power looms ‘for itself’. It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the taxpayer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is different, but that is not the case here.”
Thus, the aforesaid decision makes it quite clear that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. It has also been held by the Constitution Bench, if the tax payer is within the plain terms of the exemption, it cannot be denied its benefits by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. That apart, it has also been stated therein that if different intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is different. State of Jharkhand v. Tata Steel Limited, (2016) 11 SCC 147.
Filed under Intendment, Tax
A perusal of Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, reveals a clear acknowledgement by the Legislature, that the jurisdiction for raising a challenge to the same arbitration agreement, arbitration proceeding or arbitrable award, could most definitely arise in more than one court simultaneously. To remedy such a situation Section 42 of the Arbitration Act mandates, that the court wherein the first application arising out of such a challenge is filed, shall alone have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute(s), which are filed later in point of time. The above Legislative Intent must also be understood as mandating, that disputes arising out of the same arbitration agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral award, would not be adjudicated upon by more than one court, even though jurisdiction to raise such disputes may legitimately lie before two or more courts. State of Maharashtra v. Atlanta Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 619.