Tag Archives: landlord

Validity of Notice Under Section 30 of – Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act

In Dr. Babu Ram Sharma v. IVth Additional Judge, Saharanpur and others, (2006) 2 ARC 239 and Noor Mohd. and another v. IVth Additional District Judge , Kanpur Nagar and others, (2006)  1 ARC 550, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court again took the view that when the entire rent due till the date of notice had already been validly deposited under Section 30 of the Act, the notice of demand is bad in law, and therefore, since at the time of notice, tenants were not defaulter in payment of rent for four months or more, the suit filed on the ground of default was liable to be dismissed. It was held that the suit for eviction was not maintainable as at the time of notice, the tenant was not defaulter since he had already validly deposited the rent under section 30 of the Act. It was further held that under the circumstances, the suit was not maintainable under section 20(2) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of (Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.      The default contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) should be in regard to rent for a period of not less than four months. The provision does not say that even if the tenant is in arrears of rent for less than four months he would be liable to be evicted under it on the mere ground that default had continued for more than four months. Even Notice of demand will be invalid and could not be considered to be a notice of demand under the said provision if the tenant was not in arrears of rent for more than four months.  Nand Lal Keshari v. Shashi Bhushan Agarwal, 2020 (2) AWC 1787.

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Once Lease or Tenancy Stands Determined – Tenant’s Right to Possess the Leased Property Ends

In Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “the litigation goes on for an unreasonable length of time and the tenants in possession of the premises do not miss any opportunity of filing appeals or revisions so long as they can thereby afford to perpetuate the life of litigation and continue in occupation of the premises.” It has, then, observed that once the lease or tenancy stands determined, say, through a decree from a competent court, the tenant’s right to continue to possess the leased property ends. And for his continued use and occupation of the property for any period thereafter, he must pay damages at the rate the landlord could have let out the premises if there had been no tenant or the tenant had vacated with the lease termination. Thus, Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 has summed up the principles of interim compensation:

(1) while passing an order of stay under Rule 5 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellate Court does have jurisdiction to put the applicant on such reasonable terms as would in its opinion reasonably compensate the decree-holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event of the appeal being dismissed and in so far as those proceedings are concerned. Such terms, needless to say, shall be reasonable;

(2) in case of premises governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in view of the definition of tenant contained in clause (l) of Section 2 of the Act, the tenancy does not stand terminated merely by its termination under the general law; it terminates with the passing of the decree for eviction. With effect from that date, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent effective for the period preceding the date of the decree; (3) the doctrine of merger does not have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely because the decree of eviction stands merged in the decree passed by the superior forum at a later date. Ishwarlal Vrajlal Mistry v. Manohar U. Shetty, Writ Petition No. 13100 of 2018 decided on 18.12.2019.

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“Tenant at Sufferance”

        ‘Tenant at sufferance’ is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after termination of term or expiry of lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is on who wrongfully continues in possession after extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. A “tenancy at sufferance” does not create relationship of landlord and tenant.

        Moreover, even possession of lessee after determination of lease or expiry of period of lease becomes that of “Tenant at Sufferance”, therefore, even a quit notice is not necessary to be given and Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not at all attracted. Relying on earlier decision in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P., (1995) 5 SCC 698, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sevoke Properties Ltd. v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd., AIR 2019 SC 2664 held that once it is admitted by lessee that term of lease has expired, lease stood determined by efflux of time and in such a case, a quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property is not required to be given. It was held as under:

        “Once the lease stood determined by efflux of time, there was no necessity for a notice of termination under Section 106.” Lov Mandeshwari Saran Singh v. State of U.P., 2020 (138) ALR 845.

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Entertainment of – Release Application

The phrase “entertained” used in the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 would mean that the period of three years since the date of purchase by the landlord must have expired when the Prescribed Authority is required to entertain the release application on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. This would be a stage reached when the Court applies its judicial mind and takes up the case for decision on merits concerning the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The word “entertained” would necessarily mean entertain the grounds for consideration for the purpose of adjudication of merits and not at any stage prior thereto, i.e. neither at the stage at which the application is filed in the office of the prescribed authority nor at the stage when summons is issued to the tenant. The crux of the conclusion is that by the time the application for possession on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) is taken up by the Prescribed Authority for consideration on merits, at least minimum three years period should have elapsed since the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord/landlady. Pradeep Kumar v. Meena Devi Sahu, 2020 (138) ALR 91.

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Building in Possession of Tenant – Before its Purchase by Landlord

The first proviso to Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provides that where the building was in occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of the Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in Clause (a), unless a period of 3 years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years. Smt. Meena Begum v. Additional District Judge, 2018 (127) ALR 358.

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Property Owner – Has the Right to Use the Property As he Chooses

In Faruk Ilahi Tamboli v. B. S. Shankarrao Kokate, 2016 (1) ARC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it certainly cannot be the claim at the behest of a tenant, that the owner of a premises must continue in business with his parents or relations, assuming there was a joint business activity, to start with. That is usual, assuming there was a joint business activity, to start with. That is usual, and happens all the time when children come of age. And thereafter, they must have the choice to run their own life, by earning their own livelihood. The property owner has the right to use his property as he chooses, for running his business. There could be no irregularity if owner of the property chooses to use his property as he chooses, for running his business, independent of the business of other family members. In Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja, 2014 (2) ARC 265, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him for the purpose of his business. Even if the landlord is doing business from various other premises, it cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted presmises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business. Hari Shanker v. Om Prakash, 2018 (127) ALR 589.

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Failure to Pay Rent – Deliberate Default

In Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, (1980) 3 SCC 610, it was held that the power to strike out a party’s defence is an exceptional step and has only to be exercised where a “mood of defiance” and “gross negligence” on the part of the tenant is detected. It was held as under: “We must adopt a socially informed perspective while construing the provisions and then it will be plain that the Controller is armed with a facultative power. He may, or may not strike out the tenant’s defence. A judicial discretion has built-in self-restraint, has the scheme of the statute in mind, cannot ignore the conspectus of circumstances which are present in the case and has the brooding thought playing on the power that, in a court, striking out a party’s defence is an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all, there must be a failure to pay rent which, in the context, indicates wilful failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Secondly, the section provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes no mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence. Thus, if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. The last resort cannot be converted into the first resort; a punitive direction of court cannot be used as a booby trap to get the tenant out. Once this teleological interpretation dawns, the mist of misconception about matter-of-course invocation of the power to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given case is playing truant with the duty underlying the power. Dina Nath v. Subhash Chand Saini, (2019) 9 SCC 477

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Roof – Not a Necessary and Indispensable Adjunct for a Building

From a bare perusal of the definition of “building” in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, it is clear that unless the context otherwise requires, “building” means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out houses, appurtenant to such building; any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building and any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah, (1996) 6 SCC 342 a structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls and usually but not necessarily, covered with a roof is a building. Roof is not necessary and indispensable adjunct for a building because there can be roofless buildings. The “building” as defined in Section 3(i) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out-houses, appurtenant to such building. Therefore, an open land including any garden, garages and out-houses, appurtenant to a roofed structure for its beneficial enjoyment shall be a building within the meaning of Section 3(i) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Munnu Yadavi v. Ram Kumar Yadav, 2020 (138) ALR 70.   

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Lawful Possession

Possession may be lawful, it may be unlawful. It may be legal or illegal. The acquisition of legal possession would obviously be lawful and would of necessity involve the occurrence of some event recognized by law whereby the subject matter falls under the control of the possessor. But a problem arises where the duration for which possession is recognized is limited by the grantor or the law. Continuance of possession beyond the period specified by the grantor or recognized by law is not treated as a lawful possession. For example, a tenant acquires legal as well as lawful possession of the tenanted premises from the landlord with the express consent of the landlord but limited to the duration of the lease. On expiry of the leaser, if the landlord does not consent to the lease being continued, the possession of such tenant would not be a lawful possession. The nature of possession being not lawful would entitle the landlord to regain possession.

        From a common sense point of view, lawful possession must be the state of being a possessor in the eyes of law. The possession must be warranted or authorized by law; having the qualifications prescribed by law and not contrary to nor forbidden by law. Sawwad Ali v. Rajesh Kumar, 2019 (135) ALR 927.

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Second Notice – A New Tenancy Cannot be Inferred

In Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 205, it was held as under:

       “In the instant case, two notices to quit were given on 10th February, 1979 and 17th March, 1979. The suit was filed on June 2, 1979. The tenant offered and the landlord accepted the rent for the months of April, May and thereafter. The question is whether this by itself constitutes an act on the part of the landlord showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Mere acceptance of rent did not by itself constitute an act of the nature envisaged by Section 113, Transfer of Property Act showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. The fact remains that even after accepting the rent tendered, the landlord did file a suit for eviction, and even while prosecuting the suit accepted rent which was being paid to him by the tenant. It cannot therefore, be said that by accepting rent, he intended to waive the notice to quit and to treat the lease as subsisting. We cannot ignore the fact that in any event, even if rent was neither tendered nor accepted, the landlord in the event of success would be entitled to the payment of the arrears of rent. To avoid any controversy, in the event of termination of lease the practice followed by courts is to permit the landlord to receive each month by way of compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, an amount equal to the monthly rent payable by the tenant. It cannot, therefore, be said that mere acceptance of rent amounts to waiver of notice to quit unless there be any other evidence to prove or establish that the landlord so intended.”

       In the Judgment rendered by Orissa High Court in Bhagabat Patnaik v. Madhusudan Panda, AIR 1965 Ori 11, Section 113 has been interpreted to hold that since a valid notice to quit a lease or to determine a tenancy cannot be waived without the assent of the landlord and the tenant both, the question as to whether such facts and circumstances of the case. An English Authority in Lawenthanfal v. Banhoute, 1947 (1) ALL ER 116, was quoted to say that a new tenancy cannot be inferred on the issuance of second notice. It is in this context that it was observed that a “subsequent notice to quit is of no effect.” It was held that a tenancy is not revived by anything short of a new tenancy and in order to create a new tenancy there must be an express or implied agreement to that effect.

       The mere fact that the tenant continues in possession and rent is accepted and the suit is not instituted are insufficient circumstances for inferring an intention to create a new tenancy after expiration of the first. It was further held thus:

       “Generally speaking, giving a second notice to quit does not amount to a waiver of a notice previously given unless, with other circumstances, it is the basis for inferring an intention to create a new tenancy after expiration of the first.” Praveen Kumar Jain v. Jagdish Prasad Gupta, 2019 (132) ALR 357.

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