The word “determination” has to be
contextually determined. In Ashok Leyland
Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2004) 3
SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court has reproduced the definition of “determination”
from Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition by P. Ramanatha Iyer and Black’s Law
Dictionary, 6th Edition. It reads thus:
“Determination or order.—The expression “determination”
signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a
dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for
disposal. The expression “order” must have also a similar meaning, except that
it need not operate to end the dispute. Determination or order must be judicial
or quasi – judicial. Jaswant Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1963
A “determination” is a final judgment
for purposes of appeal when the Trial Court has completed its adjudication of the
rights of the parties in the action. Thomas
Van Dyken Joint centure v. Van Dyken,
27 NW 2d 459.
The said test clearly means that the
expression of determination signifies an expressive opinion. Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., 2019 (132) ALR 263.
Jurisdiction is the authority or power of the Court to deal with a matter and make an order carrying binding force in the facts. In support of judicial opinion for this view reference may be made to the Permanent Edition of “Words and Phrases” Vol. 23-A at P. 164. It would be appropriate to refer to two small passages occurring at pp. 174 and 175 of the volume. At p. 174, referring to the decision in Carlile v. National Oil & Dev. Co., 83 Okla 217 : 201 P 377 (1921), it has been stated:
“Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine, and in order that it may exist, the following are essential: (1) A court created by law, organized and sitting; (2) authority given to it by law to hear and determine causes of the kind in question; (3) power given to it by law to render a judgment such as it assumes to render; (4) authority over the parties to the case if the judgment is to bind them personally as a judgment in personam, which is acquired over the plaintiff by his appearance and submission of the matter to the court, and is acquired over the defendant by his voluntary appearance, or by service of process on him; (5) authority over the thing adjudicated upon its being located within the court’s territory, and by actually seizing it if liable to be carried away; (6) authority to decide the question involved, which is acquired by the question being submitted to it by the parties for decision.” State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 602.
In Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 992, it has been laid down that the preliminary decree for partition is final. It also embodies the final decision of the court. The question of finality has been discussed thus:
“The word ‘decision’ even in its popular sense means a concluded opinion (see Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary – 3rd Edition, Vol. I, P. 743). Where, therefore, the decision is embodied in the judgment which is followed by a decree finality must naturally attach itself to it in the sense that it is no longer open to question by either party except in an appeal, review or revision petition as provided for by law. It was further observed:
The mere declaration of the rights of the plaintiff by the preliminary decree would not amount to a final decision for it is well known that even if a preliminary decree is passed either in a mortgage suit or in a partition suit, there are certain contingencies in which such a preliminary decree can be modified or amended and therefore would not become final.” T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, 2017 (123) ALR 305.
In order to attract the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India, i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 of Crpc or Section 71 of IPC or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, the ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing the offence cannot be termed as the ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge. Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another, (2012) 7 SCC 721