Tag Archives: Estoppel

Consent Decree – Does Not Operate As Res Judicata

In Pulvarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically repelled the contention that a compromise decree would operate as res-judicata, though accepted that it may create estoppel by conduct—

          “The compromise decree was not a decision by the Court. It was the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. It has been said that a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The court did not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the Court could be res judicata, whether statutory under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests.“

          A full bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High court in Parma Nand v. Champa Lal, AIR 1956 All 225, explained the various types of estoppel, as follows:

          “Under the English, estoppel is of three kinds; estoppel is of three kinds; estoppel by judgment, estoppel by deed and and estoppel by pais.”

          In Baldev Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors India (P) Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 201, the Hon’ble Apex Court again specifically held that “a consent decree, according to the decisions of the Court, does not operate as Res Judicata, because a consent decree is merely the record of a contract between the parties to a suit, to which is superadded the seal of the court. A matter in contest in a suit may operate as res judicata only if there is an adjudication by the Court: the terms of Section 11 of the Code leave no scope for a contrary view. Manoj v. Smt. Devendri Devi, 2019 (137) ALR 445.    

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Filed under Civil Law, Consent Decree

Order of Appointment – Obtained Fraudulently

Fraudulently obtained order of appointment or approval can be recalled by the authority concerned. In such cases merely because the employee continued in service for a number of years, on the basis of fraudulently obtained order, cannot get any equity in his favour or any estoppels against the employer/authority. When appointment or approval has been obtained by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer. It would create no equity in his favour or any estoppels against the employer to cancel such appointment or approval since “Fraud and justice never dwell together”. Committee of Management v. State of U.P., (2018) 1 UPLBEC 610.

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Filed under Employment Law, Fraudulent Appointment

Criminal Trial – Principle of Issue Estoppel

The rule regarding issue estoppel relates to admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded on the previous occasion and mandates that the finding so rendered on earlier occasion must operate as issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings. It makes it impermissible to lead any such evidence at a subsequent stage or occasion. The law on the point was succinctly stated in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 621:
“The court has time and again explained the principle of issue estoppel in a criminal trial observing that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppels or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a different offence. This rule is distinct from the doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial. Thus, the rule relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court in a previous trial on a factual issue. Ashwani Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 308.

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Filed under Criminal Law, Principle of Issue Estoppel