Tag Archives: equality

Doctrine of Equal Pay for Equal Work – When can be invoked

In Deb Narayan Shyam v. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 286, the Court summarized as to when doctrine of equal pay for equal work would apply:
“Large number of decisions have been cited with regard to the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. The principle is settled that if the two categories of posts perform the same duties and function and carry the same qualification then there should not be any distinction in pay scale between the two categories of posts similarly situated. But when they are different and perform different duties and qualifications for recruitment being different, then they cannot be said to be equated so as to qualify for equal pay for equal work.”
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, 2009 (11) SCALE 619, the court said that it is well settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated. Similarity in designation or nature or equation of work is not determinative for equality in the matter of pay scales. The court has to consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, qualifications, nature of work, the value thereof, responsibility, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc., In other words the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scale only when there is a wholesale identity between the two posts.
That doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated and that similarity of the designation or nature or quantum of work is not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales and that the court has to consider several factors and only when there was wholesale identity between the holders of two posts, equality clause can be invoked and not otherwise. Vishal Chand v. State of U.P., 2017 (1) AWC 841.

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Filed under Employment Law, Equal Pay for Equal Work

Service Related Claim – Based on a Continuing Wrong

In the case of Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, it was held as under:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue related to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc. affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principle relating to recurring/successive wrong will apply. Habib Ali v. State of U.P., 2015 (4) AWC 4174.

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Doctrine of Equality – Among Persons Found Guilty

The doctrine of equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The disciplinary authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e. lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 73.

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Filed under Employment Law, Equality