A compromise decree passed by a court would ordinarily be covered by Section 17(1)(b) but sub-section (2) of Section 17 provides for an exception for any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by virtue of sub-section 2(vi) of Section 17 any decree or order of a court does not require registration. In sub-clause (vi) of sub-section 2, one category is excepted from sub-clause (vi), a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by conjointly reading Section 17(1)(b) and Section 17(2)(vi), it is clear that a compromise decree comprising immovable property other than which is the subject matter, of the suit or proceeding requires registration, although any decree or order of a court is exempted from registration by virtue of Section 17(2)(vi). Mohd. Yusuf v. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 264.
Tag Archives: Compromise
Compromise Decree Comprising of Immovable Property Other Than That Which is subject matter of Suit or Proceeding – Requires Registration
Non-compoundable offences can be quashed under Article 226 of Constitution of India/482 CrPC, which are overwhelmingly and predominantly of civil character arising out of commercial transactions, matrimonial/family disputes and parties have resolved their disputes amicably, as such offences are private in nature having no impact on the society. But heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. and the offences under the special statutes like prevention of corruption Act or offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity cannot be quashed on the basis of settlement/compromise. However, where the High Court finds that these offences are merely incorporated without any material to support, it can quash the proceedings relating to such offences. For this purpose, it would be open for the High Court to examine whether the materials collected, if proved, would lead to framing of charge. This exercise is only permissible, when a charge sheet is filed or a charge is framed and/or during the trial, not when the matter is under investigation. Ram Kailash Tripathi v. State of U.P., 2020 (110) ACC 476.
In the case of Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi, (2012) 3 SCC 548, it was held as under:
“It is to be borne in mind that the term ‘compromise’ essentially means settlement of differences by mutual consent. In such process, the adversarial claims come to rest. The cavil between the parties is given a decent burial. A compromise which is arrived at by the parties puts an end to the litigative battle. Sometimes the parties feel that it is an unfortunate bitter struggle and allow good sense to prevail to resolve the dispute. In certain cases, by intervention of well wishers, the conciliatory process commences and eventually, by consensus and concurrence, rights get concretised. A reciprocal settlement with a clear mind is regarded as noble. It signifies magnificient and majestic facets of the human mind. The exalted state of affairs brings in quintessence of sublime solemnity and social stability.” Nand Kishore Gaur v. Regional Deputy Director of Education, 2018 (4) AWC 3370.