Dealing with Order II, Rule 2, CPC, Hon’ble Apex Court in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161, held that this provision has no application to cases where the plaintiff has based his suit on separate and distinct causes of action and chooses to relinquish one or the other of them and that in such cases, it is always open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the basis of a distinct cause of action. Lalit Kumar Upreti v. Chunni Lal Gujral, 2018 (4) AWC 3693.
Tag Archives: Cause of Action
If a release application is filed under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for bona fide need of the landlord himself or any member of his family, it may stand frustrated because of some subsequent event and the same is rejected, however, subsequently, because of subsequent event, like need of other family members, who may now have become eligible/competent to carry on business or in case of residential building more accommodation is required because of increase in family etc., etc., or of the landlord himself because of any subsequent event like his retirement etc., which have taken place after rejection of his earlier release application, it cannot be said that the subsequent release application would not be maintainable as again it would be a different cause of action and if held otherwise, it would again frustrate the intention of the law. Lalit Kumar Upreti v. Chunni Lal Gujral, 2018 (4) AWC 3693.
It is undoubtedly true that the law does not compel a litigant to combine one or more cause of action is a suit. It is open to a plaintiff, if he so wishes, however to combine more than one cause of action against same parties in one suit. However, it is undoubtedly true that the embargo in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC will arise only if the claim, which is omitted or relinquished and the reliefs which are omitted and not claimed, arise from one cause of action. If there is more than one cause of action, Order 2 Rule 2 CPC will not apply. It is undoubtedly also true that Order 2 Rule 2 CPC manifests a technical rule as it has the effect of posing an obstacle in the path of a litigant ventilating his grievance in the Courts. But there is an equally important principle that no person shall be vexed twice on the same cause of action. Pramod Kumar v. Zalak Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 621.
In Nand Ram v. Garware Polyster Ltd., (2016) 149 FLR 306, it was held that where the management at Aurangabad first took a decision to transfer the workman from Aurangabad to Pondicherry and then to close the unit at Pondicherry. It was then held that while industrial dispute of termination from service could validly be raised at Pondicherry, however, in such a case, it does not mean that the adjudication proceedings initiated at Aurangabad, where the management took a decision to close the Pondicherry unit, were without jurisdiction.
In matters of industrial dispute, the principle of part cause of action does apply and there is no rule, that only if the two or more States will be competent to make a reference. It will depend on the facts of each case. Also, it may have to be borne in mind, how much or which part of the cause of action arose inside the State where a reference happens to be made. Also, in case of two references arising in two different States, involving the same set of facts or cause of action, different tests may have to be evolved to see which of the two references arose first or which of the reference is more comprehensive or which may require to be decided first or which would suite the parties. Veritaz Health Care Ltd. v. State of U.P.¸ 2017 (3) AWC 3051.
The meaning of the expression ‘person aggrieved’ will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the Statute. One of the meanings is that person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. The restricted meaning of the expression requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ means a person who has suffered a legal grievance, i.e. a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has lawfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something.
A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. A person aggrieved, means a person who is wrongly deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. “Person aggrieved” means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. Naval Kishore v. State of U.P., 2017 (122) ALR 121.
Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, by using the words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”, categorically specifies that the arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract so far as award of interest from the date of cause of action to date of the award is concerned. Therefore, where the parties had agreed that no interest shall be payable, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot award interest.
In Union of India v. Saraswat Trading Agency, (2009) 16 SCC 504, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in the said case that if there is a bar against payment of interest in the contract, the arbitrator cannot award any interest for such period. Union of India v. Bright Power Projects (I) Pvt. Ltd., 2015 (4) AWC 3862.
The grant of award of interest on arbitrable claims by the Arbitral Tribunal is not inherently illegal or against any public policy or per se bad in law or beyond the powers of the Arbitral Tribunal. In other words, it is permissible to award interest in arbitrable claims by the Arbitral Tribunal.
Indeed, Sections 31(7)(a) and (b) of the Act empower the Arbitral Tribunal to award interest on the awarded sum and secondly, it is always subject to the agreement between the parties.
It is a well settled principle in Arbitration Law that the award of an Arbitral Tribunal once passed is binding on the parties. The reason being that the parties having chosen their own arbitrator and given him authority to decide the specific disputes arising between them must respect his decision as far as possible and should not make any attempt to find fault in each issue decided by him only because it is decided against one party. It is only when the issue decided is found to be bad in law in the light of any of the specified grounds set out in Section 34 of the Act, the Court may consider it appropriate to interfere in the award else not. Union of India v. Susaka Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 182.
On a due and anxious consideration of the provisions contained in Section 20 of the CPC, Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and the object with which the latter provisions have been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having its principal office/carries on business or personally works for gain, the suit can be filed at such place/places. Plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at a place where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain de hors the fact that the cause of action has not arisen at a place where he/they are residing or anyone of them is residing, carries on business or personally works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at such a place has to read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in part, plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying on business at other far flung places also. The very intendment of the insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act is the convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience of the parties has been given a statutory expression in Section 20 of the CPC as well. The interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief of causing inconevience to parties.
The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain. The object is to ensure that the plaintiff is not deterred from instituting infringement proceedings “because the court in which proceedings are to be instituted is at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary residence. The impediment created to the plaintiff by Section 20 CPC of going to a place where it was not having ordinary residence or principal place of business was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the Corporation is having ordinary residence/principal place of business and cause of action has also arisen at that place, it has to institute a suit at the said place and not at other places. The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the field where the plaintiff is having its principal place of business at a particular place and the cause of action has also arisen at that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant place where its subordinate office is situated though at such place no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause great harm and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative intendment of the provisions so enacted.
Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No doubt about it that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing or carrying on business or personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in part arises. However if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has to file a suit at that place. Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, 2015 (4) AWC 4035.
The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.” Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 10 SCC 663.