In Nathani Steels Ltd. v. Associated Constructions, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 324, it was held as under:
“Even otherwise we feel that once the parties have arrived at a settlement in respect of any dispute or difference arising under a contract and that dispute or the difference is amicable settled by way of a final settlement by and between the parties, unless that settlement is set aside in proper proceedings, it cannot lie in the mouth of one of the parties to the settlement to spurn it on the ground that it was a mistake and proceed to invoke the arbitration clause. If this is permitted the sanctity of contract, the settlement also being a contract, would be wholly lost and it would be open to one party to take the benefit under the settlement and then to question the same on the ground of mistake without having the settlement set aside.” WAPCOS Ltd. v. Salma Dam Joint Venture, (2020) 3 SCC 169.
The legal consequence is well taken care of by the provisions of Section 15(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 2 of the Act which provides, where the Arbitrator withdraws from office for any reason, a substitute arbitrator should be appointed according to the Rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced. Therefore in the first place a substitute arbitrator may be appointed in view of the clear provisions of law in that regard. Second as to the procedure to be followed, again there is no doubt that it would have to remain the same as had been followed at the time of appointment of the arbitrator who has rescued himself. M/s Manish Engineering Enterprises v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd., 2020 (138) ALR 930.
In Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v. Sometal SAL, 2010 Bus LR 880, a distinction was made between a “single contract case” and a “two contract case”. A “single contract case” is one where the arbitration clause is contained in a standard form contract to which there is a general reference in the contract between the parties. On the other hand, where the arbitration clause is contained in an earlier contract/some other contract, and a reference is made to incorporate it in the contract between the parties, it is a “two contract case”. The Court held that incorporation by general reference in a single contract case is valid. However, in a “two contract case”, where reference is made to an arbitration clause in a separate contract, the reference must be specific to the arbitration clause. The judgment in Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v. Sometal SAL, 2010 Bus LR 880 has been affirmed by the Queen’s Bench Division in SEA 2011 Inc. v. ICT Ltd., 2018 EWHC 520 (Comm).
The Court recognised the following broad categories in which the parties attempt to incorporate an arbitration clause:
“(1) A and B make a contract in which they incorporate standard terms. These may be the standard terms of one party set out on the back of an offer letter or an order, or contained in another document to which reference is made; or terms embodied in the rules of an organisation of which A or B or both are members; or they may be terms standard in a particular trade or industry.
(2) A and B make a contract incorporating terms previously agreed between A and B in another contract or contracts to which they were both parties.
(3) A and B make a contract incorporating terms agreed between A (or B) and C. Common examples are a bill of lading incorporating the terms of a charter to which A is a party; reinsurance contracts incorporating the terms of an underlying insurance; excess insurance contracts incorporating the terms of the primary layer of insurance; and building or engineering sub-contracts incorporating the terms of a main contract or sub-sub-contracts incorporating the terms of a sub-contract. (4) A and B make a contract incorporating terms agreed between C and D. Bills of lading, reinsurance and insurance contracts and building contracts may fall into this category.” Giriraj Garg v. Coal India Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 192.
An arbitration agreement does not require registration under the Registration Act. Even if it is found as one of the clauses in a contract or instrument, it is an independent agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration, which is independent of the main contract or instrument. Therefore having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act read with Section 16(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registerable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engineering Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209.
Where the contract or instrument is voidable at the option of a party (as for example under Section 19 of the Contract Act, 1872), the invalidity that attaches itself to the main agreement may also attach itself to the arbitration agreement, if the reasons which make the main agreement voidable, exist in relation to the making of the arbitration agreement also. For example, if a person is made to sign an agreement to sell his property under threat of physical harm or threat to life, and the said person repudiates the agreement on that ground not only the agreement for sale, but any arbitration agreement therein will not be binding. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engineering Ltd., (2019) 9 SCC 209.
Given the fact that an appellate proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding as has been held in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, AIR 1941 FC 5, and repeatedly followed in various judgments, any delay beyond 120 days in the filing of an appeal under Section 37 from an application being either dismissed or allowed under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 should not be allowed as it will defeat the overall statutory purpose of arbitration proceedings being decided with utmost dispatch. N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109. (See also Union of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC 111.)
In Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. [Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 532 the following has been laid down:
“ The Arbitral Tribunals are private fora chosen voluntarily by the parties to the dispute, to adjudicate their disputes in place of courts and tribunals which are public fora constituted under the laws of the country. Every civil or commercial dispute, either contractual or non-contractual, which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunals is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Adjudication of certain categories of proceedings are reserved by the legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of public policy. Certain other categories of cases, though not expressly reserved for adjudication by public fora (courts and tribunals), may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. Consequently, where the cause/dispute is inarbitrable, the court where a suit is pending, will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under Section 8 of the Act, even if the parties might have agreed upon arbitration as the forum for settlement of such disputes.
The well-recognised examples of non-arbitrable disputes are: (i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child custody; (iii) guardianship matters; (iv) insolvency and winding-up matters; (v) testamentary matters (grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificate); and (vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or decide the disputes.
It may be noticed that the cases referred to above relate to actions in rem. A right in rem is a right exercisable against the world at large, as contrasted from a right in personam which is an interest protected solely against specific individuals. Actions in personam refer to actions determining the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject-matter of the case, whereas actions in rem refer to actions determining the title to property and the rights of the parties, not merely among themselves but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property. Correspondingly, a judgment in personam refers to a judgment against a person as distinguished from a judgment against a thing, right or status and a judgment in rem refers to a judgment that determines the status or condition of property which operates directly on the property itself.
Generally and traditionally all disputes relating to rights in personam are considered to be amenable to arbitration; and all disputes relating to rights in rem are required to be adjudicated by courts and public tribunals, being unsuited for private arbitration. This is not however a rigid or inflexible rule. Disputes relating to subordinate rights in personam arising from rights in rem have always been considered to be arbitrable.” Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751
In Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the commencement period for computing limitation is the date of receipt of award or the date of disposal of request under Section 33 (i.e. correction/additional award). If Section 17 of the Limitation Act were to be applied for computing the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, the starting period of limitation would be the date of discovery of the alleged fraud or mistake. The starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) would be different from the Limitation Act.
In the context of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, a party can challenge an award as soon as it receives the award. Once an award is received, a party has knowledge of the award and the limitation period commences. The objecting party is therefore precluded from invoking Section 17(1)(b) and (d) of the Limitation Act once it has knowledge of the award. Section 17(1)(a) and (c) of the Limitation Act may not even apply, if they are extended to Section 34, since they deal with a scenario where the application is “based upon” the fraud of the respondent or if the application is for “relief from the consequences of a mistake.” Section 34 application is based on the award and not on the fraud of the respondent and does not seek the relief of consequence of a mistake. P. Radha Rai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445.
Section 12(5) of the Arbitration
& Conciliation Act is a new provision which relates to the de jure inability
of an arbitrator to act as such. Under this provision, any prior agreement to
the contrary is wiped out by the non obstante clause in Section 12(5) the
moment any person whose relationship with the parties or the counsel or the
subject-matter of the dispute falls under the Seventh Schedule. The sub-section
then declares that such person shall be “ineligible” to be appointed as
arbitrator. The only way in which this ineligibility can be removed is by the
proviso, which again is a special provision which states that parties
may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive
the applicability of Section 12(5) by an express agreement in writing. What is
clear, therefore, is that where, under any agreement between the parties, a
person falls within any of the categories set out in the Seventh Schedule, he
is, as a matter of law, ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. The only
way in which this ineligibility can be removed, again, in law, is that parties
may after disputes have arisen between them, waive the
applicability of this sub-section by an “express agreement in writing”.
Obviously, the “express agreement in writing” has reference to a person who is
interdicted by the Seventh Schedule, but who is stated by parties (after the
disputes have arisen between them) to be a person in whom they have faith
notwithstanding the fact that such person is interdicted by the eventh
Unlike Section 4 of the Arbitration
& Conciliation Act which deals with deemed waiver of the right to object by
conduct, the proviso to Section 12(5) will only apply if subsequent to disputes
having arisen between the parties, the parties waive the applicability of
sub-section (5) of Section 12 by an express agreement in writing. For this
reason, the argument based on the analogy of Section 7 of the Act must also be
rejected. Section 7 deals with arbitration agreements that must be in writing,
and then explains that such agreements may be contained in documents which
provide a record of such agreements. On the other hand, Section 12(5) refers to
an “express agreement in writing”. The expression “express agreement in
writing” refers to an agreement made in words as opposed to an agreement which
is to be inferred by conduct. Here, Section 9 of the Contract Act, 1872 becomes
important. It states:
“9. Promises, express
and implied.—Insofar as the proposal or acceptance of any promise is
made in words, the promise is said to be express. Insofar as such proposal or
acceptance is made otherwise than in words, the promise is said to be implied.”
It is thus necessary that there be an “express” agreement in
writing. Bharat Broadband Network Ltd.
v. United Telecoms Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC
In Union of
India v. Master Construction Company,
(2011) 12 SCC 349, it was held as under:
our opinion, there is no rule of the absolute kind. In a case where the claimant
contends that a discharge voucher or no claim certificate has been obtained by
fraud, coercion, duress or undue influence and the other side contests the correctness
thereof, the Chief Justice/his designate must look into this aspect to find out
at least, prima facie, whether or not the dispute is bona fide and genuine.
Where the dispute raised by the claimant with regard to validity of the discharge
voucher or no – claim certificate or settlement agreement, prima facie, appears
to be lacking in credibility, there may not be a necessity to refer the dispute
for arbitration at all.”
the proposition which has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, what
reveals is that a mere plea of fraud, coercion or undue influence in itself is
not enough and the party who alleged is under obligation to prima facie
establish the same by placing satisfactory material on record before the Chief
Justice or his Designate to exercise power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 which has been considered by the Hon’ble Supre Court
in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Genus Power Infrastructure Ltd., (2015)
2 SCC 424 as below:
is therefore clear that a bald plea of fraud, coercion, duress or undue
influence is not enough and the party who sets up a plea, must prima facie
establish the same by placing material before the Chief Justice/ his Designate.”
is true that there cannot be a rule of its kind that mere allegation of
discharge voucher or no claim certificate being obtained by
fraud/coercion/undue influence practiced by other party in itself is sufficient
for appointment of the arbitrator unless the claimant who alleges that
execution of the discharge agreement or no claim certificate was obtained on
account of fraud/coercion/undue influence practiced by the other party is able
to substantiate the same, the correctness thereof may be open for the Chief
Justice/his Designate to look into this aspect to find out at least prima facie
whether the dispute is bona fide and genuine in taking a decision to invoke
Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Antique Art Exports Pvt. Ltd., (2019) 5