The consequence of amendment made in Section 37 of the U.P. State Universities Act of 1973 is essentially three fold. Firstly, the power to grant affiliation now stands vested in the Executive Council of the University concerned and the requirement of prior approval of Chancellor/State Government stood dispensed with. Secondly, the privilege of affiliation can now be extended to a college only when it fulfills conditions of affiliation, as may be prescribed. Thirdly, the proviso which permitted grant of temporary affiliation even if conditions of affiliation were not fulfilled entirely but only substantially stood deleted. No further amendment is made in the U.P. State Universities Act after the year 2014. The Executive Council is thus empowered in the Act now to grant privileges of affiliation only if the college fulfills all conditions of affiliation as are specified in the Statutes of the University. The object for which temporary affiliation was made permissible i.e. to secure fulfillment of all conditions of affiliation while granting affiliation even if conditions of affiliation are only substantially fulfilled and not in its entirety ceased to exist. Yashraj College of Professional Studies v. State of U.P. , Writ – C No. – 31170 of 2019
The concept of human error or inadvertent error has been explained in brief by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Price Water, Coopers (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2012) 11 SCC 316, as under:— “The contents of the Tax Audit Report suggest that there is no question of the assessee concealing its income. There is also no question of the assessee furnishing any inaccurate particulars. It appears that all that has happened in the present case is that through a bona fide and inadvertent error, the assessee while submitting its return, failed to add the provision for gratuity to its total income. This can only be described as a human error which we are all prone to make. The calibre and expertise of the assessee has little or nothing to do with the inadvertent error. That the assessee should have been careful cannot be doubted, but the absence of due care, in a case such as the present, does not mean that the assessee is guilty of either furnishing inaccurate particulars or attempting to conceal its income.” Anand Kumar Tripathi v. State of U.P., Writ – A No. – 162 of 2020, decided on February 14, 2020
Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1632, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “However, we must differentiate from this principle insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the selection process.” Mohan Lal Yaduwanshi v. State of U.P, Service Bench No. – 18370 of 2019, decided on January 13, 2020
In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a candidate seeking appointment to a civil post cannot be regarded to have acquired an indefeasible right to appointment in such post merely because of the appearance of his name in the merit list. It was held as under: “It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted.” Mohd. Rashid v. Local Bodies, (2020) 2 SCC 582
In Ritesh Tiwari v. State of U.P. (2010) 10 SCC 677, it was held as under:— “It is settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. It would be ironical to permit a person to rely upon a law, in violation of which he has obtained the benefits. Saraswati Vidya Mandir Inter College V. State of U.P., Writ C. No. 16120 of 2009 Connected with Writ – C. No. 26354 of 2009, decided on 18.05.2020.
In Arun Vats v. Pallavi Sharma, reported as 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11817 and Niharika Yadav v. Manish Kumar Yadav in Crl. Rev. Petition 755/201, decided on 18.12.2019 where, while relying upon the decision rendered in the case of Shalija v. Khobbana reported as (2018) 12 SCC 199, it was held that ‘capable of earning’ and ‘actual earning’ are entirely two different things. Merely because the wife is ‘capable of earning’ is not a sufficient reason to deny her the maintenance. It was also stated that the petitioner has qualified CTET test and is now more qualified to earn. In Swapan Kumar Banerjee v. The State of West Bengal, reported as 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:“The next issue raised was that the wife being a qualified architect from a reputed university i.e. Jadavpur University, Calcutta would be presumed to have sufficient income. It is pertinent to mention that as far as the husband is concerned, his income through taxable returns has been brought on record which shows that he was earning a substantial amount of Rs. 13,16,585/- per year and on that basis Rs. 10,000/- per month has been awarded as monthly maintenance to the wife. No evidence has been led to show what is the income of the wife or where the wife is working. It was for the husband to lead such evidence. In the absence of any such evidence no presumption can be raised that the wife is earning sufficient amount to support herself.” Anita v. Amit, Crl. Rev. P. 515/2018, decided on 24.02.2020
Since salary to teaching and non-teaching staff has to be disbursed pursuant to bills presented under the signatures of the manager and he also signs on the cheque, it is imperative that the Inspector authorises only such representative of the management which is constituted in accordance with the scheme of management. In addition to the functions assigned to a management in the U.P. High Schools And Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers And Other Employees) Act, of 1971, there are other responsibilities entrusted upon the management by virtue of provisions contained in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The U.P. Intermediate Education Act of 1921, therefore, contemplates that a scheme of administration shall exist for every institution recognized under the Act of 1921. The scheme of administration shall, amongst other matters provide for the constitution of a committee of management which is vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the Institution. The requirement of having such scheme of administration and also the particulars which it must contain are specified in Section 16-A of the Act of 1921. Sub-section (6) of Section 16-A mandates that every recognized institution shall be managed in accordance with the scheme of administration provided for in Sub-sections (1) to (6) thereof. Amendment has been made in the Act of 1921 to incorporate Section 16-CC and Section 16-CCC vide U.P. Act No. 1 of 1981. Third Schedule has also been added vide the same amending Act laying down principles on which approval to a scheme of administration shall be accorded. One of the factors specified in the Schedule is to provide for periodical elections. The scheme of administration is also required to be approved by the Deputy Director of Education.
The object of enumerating need to have a scheme of administration and for a committee of management to be constituted as per it is to ensure that the body entrusted with the task of management functions in a democratic manner and the officials of the State interact only with a body duly elected in accordance with the approved scheme of administration. It is in this context that the term recognition needs to be understood for the committee of management of the Institution concerned. There is otherwise no specific provision in the Act of 1921 for grant of recognition. Committee of Management Thakur Biri Singh Inter College v. State of U.P. , Writ – C No. – 28560 of 2019, decided on 25.02. 2020
On perusal of Section 16-FF of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, it is evident on the face of it that without approval of the District Inspector of Schools, no appointment on the post of Lecturer or Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade can be made in the institution recognized under the Act of 1921. It is further clarified that on submission of papers in case the District Inspector of Schools do not pass any order within a period of 1 month, then the selection is deemed to have been approved. Dr.Hemant Chaudhary V. State of U.P., Writ – A No. – 1821 of 2020, Decided on March 3, 2020
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Somabhai Kanjibhai Patel v. Abbasbhai Jafarbhai Daginawala, 1993 (2) GLR 1337, has held that in a contract for sale of all seven plots, sale of one plot only would amount to refusal to perform the contract in its entirety. The starting point of limitation would come into play as soon as performance of the contract in its entirety is refused either expressly or by necessary implication evinced by such contract of sale of one plot therefrom. It is held that if the starting point of limitation is not allowed to run on the ground of refusal of performance of the contract in part, no suit could be instituted till the performance of the contract in its entirety is refused. In that case, the suit filed before the entire contract is broken might be branded as premature. It is held that besides, the starting point of limitation cannot be permitted to be postponed indefinitely as in that case. The prescribed period of limitation under Article 54 of the Act is three years from the date performance of the contract is refused to the knowledge of the litigating party. Shetty Associates Pvt. Ltd. v.Samta Builders Private Limited, (2019) 4 Bom CR 735.
It is trite that the question of addition of parties under Order I Rule 10(2) is not one of the initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Under the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2), the Court is empowered to direct that a person be added as party to the suit, if his presence in court is necessary in order to enable the court to adjudicate all the questions involved in the suit effectively and completely. The real test to determine whether a party is a necessary party to the suit is, whether in the absence of the person sought to be impleaded as a party to the suit, the controversy raised in the suit cannot be effectively and completely adjudicated. It is also well recognised that the expression “to settle all questions” employed in sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I receives a liberal and wide interpretation so as to facilitate the adjudication of all the questions pertaining to the subject matter of the suit. The jurisdictional condition is that the party sought to be impleaded must have a direct interest in the subject matter of litigation in contra-distinction to a commercial interest. Obviating multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision. Jayashree Chandrakant Thite v. Padmavati Mohanlal Parekh, Chamber Summons No. 1359 of 2000 in Suit No. 2231 of 1986, Decided on February 7, 2020.