Monthly Archives: October 2014

Workman – Accident and Injury

‘Accident’ and ‘Injury’ are distinct in cases where accident is an event happening externally to a man, eg., when a workman falls from the ladder and suffers injury. The less obvious cases of accident are strain causing rupture, bursting of aneurism, failure of muscular action of the heart, exposure to draught causing chill, etc. Such accidents can be called as internal accidents. In such cases, it is hardly possible to distinguish between the ‘accident’ and ‘injury’. The rupture is an accident, at the same time injury leading to death or incapacity at once or after a lapse of time. Thus in cases of internal accidents, “Accident” and “Injury” coincide. But the common factor in all cases of accident, whether internal or external is some concrete happening at a definite point of time and incapacity resulting from such happening. An accident happening to a person in or about any premises at which, he is for the time being employed for the purpose of his Employer’s trade or business shall be deemed to raise out of and in the course of employment.
At times accident need not be due to immediate cause or as a result of collusion or sudden mishap. Even a non-spontaneous injury resulting in death or causing injury to workman during the course or arising out of employment can also be termed as accidental injury.
The word ‘Injury’ includes physiological injury. The physiological injury suffered by a workman due mainly to the progress of a disease unconnected with employment, may amount to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment if the work which the workman was doing at the time of the occurrence of the injury contributed to its occurrence. The connection between the injury and employment may be furnished by ordinary strain of ordinary work if the strain did in fact contribute to or accelerate or hasten the injury. M.D., Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Jayalakshmi, 2014 (142) FLR 978.

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Filed under Accident and Injury, Labour Law

Due Diligence

The phrase “due diligence” came for consideration before the Supreme Court in Chandra Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, 2005 (34) AIC 249 (SC) : (2005) 6 SCC 344, in which it has been held that the words “due diligence” have not been defined in the CPC. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edition 2006), the word “diligence” means careful and persistent application or effort. “Diligent” means careful and steady in application to one’s work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black’s Law Dictionary (18th Edition), “diligence” means a continual effort to accomplish something, care, caution, the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. “Due Diligence” means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition 13-A) “due diligence” in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. “Due Diligence” means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs.
The Hon’ble Apex Court again in J. Samuel v. Gattu Mahesh, 2012 (115) RD 533, held that due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is necessary before certain kinds of relief are requested. Duly diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the adjudicatory mechanism to attain an anticipated relief. The term “due diligence” determines the scope of a party’s constructive knowledge, claim and is very critical to the outcome of the suit. Vidyawati v. State of U.P., 2014 (124) RD 722 (LB).

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Differentiation is not Discrimination

The Constitution permits the State to determine, by the process of classification, what should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to law enacted on a particular subject. There is bound to be some degree of inequality when there is segregation of one class from the other. However, such segregation must be rational and not artificial or evasive. In other words, the classification must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics, which are to be found in all persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. If the object itself is discriminatory, then explanation that classification is reasonable having rational relation to the object sought to be achieved is immaterial.
Undoubtedly, every differentiation is not a discrimination but at the same time, differentiation must be founded on pertinent and real differences as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. A simple physical grouping which separates one category from the other without any rational basis is not a sound or intelligible differentia. The separation or segregation must have a systematic relation and rational basis and the object of such segregation must not be discriminatory. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 8 SCC 682.

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Offence Under Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act – Jurisdiction

(1)An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank.
(2)Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under section 142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the date the cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138.
(3)The cause of action to file a complaint accrues to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if —
(a)the dishonoured cheque is presented to the drawee bank within a period of six months from the date of its issue.
(b)If the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount within thirty days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the dishonor of the cheque, and
(c)If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of receipt of such notice.
(4)The facts constituting cause of action do not constitute the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.
(5)The proviso to Section 138 simply postpones/defers institution of criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the Court till such time cause of action in terms of clause (c) of proviso accrues to the complainant.
(6)Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured.
(7)The general rule stipulated under Section 177 CrPC applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the court within whose jurisdiction the dishonor takes place except in situations where the offence of dichonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed alongwith other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof. Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 (86) ACC 882.

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