In Dr. Babu Ram Sharma v. IVth Additional Judge, Saharanpur and others, (2006) 2 ARC 239 and Noor Mohd. and another v. IVth Additional District Judge , Kanpur Nagar and others, (2006) 1 ARC 550, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court again took the view that when the entire rent due till the date of notice had already been validly deposited under Section 30 of the Act, the notice of demand is bad in law, and therefore, since at the time of notice, tenants were not defaulter in payment of rent for four months or more, the suit filed on the ground of default was liable to be dismissed. It was held that the suit for eviction was not maintainable as at the time of notice, the tenant was not defaulter since he had already validly deposited the rent under section 30 of the Act. It was further held that under the circumstances, the suit was not maintainable under section 20(2) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of (Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The default contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) should be in regard to rent for a period of not less than four months. The provision does not say that even if the tenant is in arrears of rent for less than four months he would be liable to be evicted under it on the mere ground that default had continued for more than four months. Even Notice of demand will be invalid and could not be considered to be a notice of demand under the said provision if the tenant was not in arrears of rent for more than four months. Nand Lal Keshari v. Shashi Bhushan Agarwal, 2020 (2) AWC 1787.
Validity of Notice Under Section 30 of – Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act
It is quite apparent from a bare reading of the provisions of section 72(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 that every holder of securities has a right to nominate any person to whom his securities shall “vest” in the event of his death. In the case of joint-holders also, they have a right to nominate any person to whom “all the rights in the securities shall vest” in the event of death of all joint holders. Sub-section (3) of section 72 contains a non-obstante clause in respect of anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, where a nomination is validly made in the prescribed manner, it purports to confer on any person “the right to vest” the securities of the company, all the rights in the securities shall vest in the nominee unless a nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner. It is prima facie apparent that vesting is absolute, and the provisions supersede by virtue of a non-obstante clause any other law for the time being in force. Prima facie shares vest in a nominee, and he becomes absolute owner of the securities on the strength of nomination. Rule 19(2) of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 framed under the Act, also indicates to the same effect. Under Rule 19(8), a nominee becomes entitled to receive the dividends or interests and other advantages to which he would have been entitled to if he were the registered holder of the securities; and after becoming a registered holder, he can participate in the meetings of the company. Aruna Oswal v. Pankaj Oswal, (2020) SCC Online SC 570.
In J.P. Srivastava & Sons Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. M/s. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2005 SC 83, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the object of prescribing a qualifying percentage of shares to entertain petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956. It was held that the object is to ensure that frivolous litigation is not indulged in by persons, who have no legal stake in the company. If the Court is satisfied that the petitioners represents the body of shareholders holding the requisite percentage, the Court may proceed with the matter. It was held as under:
“The object of prescribing a qualifying percentage of shares in petitioners and their supporters to file petitions under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 is clearly to ensure that frivolous litigation is not indulged in by persons who have no real stake in the company. However, it is of interest that the English Companies Act contains no such limitation. What is required in these matters is a broad commonsense approach. If the Court is satisfied that the petitioners represent a body of shareholders holding the requisite percentage, it can assume that the involvement of the company in litigation is not lightly done and that it should pass orders to bring to an end the matters complained of and not reject it on a technical requirement. Substance must take precedence over form. Of course, there are some rules which are vital and go to the root of the matter which cannot be broken. There are others where non-compliance may be condoned or dispensed with. In the latter case, the rule is merely directory provided there is substantial compliance with the rules read as a whole and no prejudice is caused. (See Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta (AIR 1956 SC 140). Aruna Oswal v. Pankaj Oswal, (2020) SCC Online SC 570.
A will may contain several clauses and the latter clause may be inconsistent with the earlier clause. In such a situation, the last intention of the testator is given effect to and it is on this basis that the latter clause is held to prevail over the earlier clause. This is regulated by the well known maxim ‘cum duo inter se pugnantia reperiuntur in testamento ultimum ratum est’ which means that if in a will there are two inconsistent provisions, the latter shall prevail over the earlier. (see Hammond, In re, Hammond v. Treharne, (1938) ALL ER 308). It may, however, be pointed out that this rule of interpretation can be invoked only if different clauses cannot be reconciled. (See: Rameshwar Baksh Singh v. Balraj Kaur, AIR 1935 PC 187). M. S. Bhavani v. M.S. Raghu Nandan, (2020) 5 SCC 361.
The criminal offence of defamation under Section 499 Indian Penal Code is committed when a person makes a defamatory imputation which, as explained in Mohd. Abdulla Khan v. Prakash K., (2018) 1 SCC 615, is as under:
“To constitute an offence of defamation it requires a person to make some imputation concerning other person;
- Such imputation must be made either
- With intention, or
- Knowledge, or
- Having a reason to believe
that such an imputation will the reputation of the person against whom the imputation is made.
- Imputation could be, by
- Words, either spoken or written, or
- By making signs, or
- Visible representations
- Imputation could be either made or published.
The difference between making of an imputation and publishing the same is:
If ‘X’ tells ‘Y’ that ‘Y’ is a criminal–‘X’ makes an imputation. If ‘X’ tells ‘Z’ that ‘Y’ is a criminal—‘X’ publishes the imputation.
The essence of publication in the context of Section 499 is the communication of defamatory imputation to persons other than the persons against whom the imputation is made. A publication, on the other hand, is made when the imputation is communicated to persons other than the persons about whom the defamatory imputation is conveyed. A person, who makes the defamatory imputation, could also publish the imputation and thus could be the maker and the publisher of a defamatory imputation. On the other hand, a person may be liable though he may not have made the statement but he publishes it. Google India Private Ltd. v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162.
Under Section 241(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, the Central Government, if it is of the opinion that the affairs of the Company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest, may apply itself to the Tribunal for orders under the said Chapter, which is headed “prevention of Oppression and Mismanagement”. Apart from the vast powers that are given to the Tribunal under Section 242, powers under Sections 337 and 339 are also given in aid of this power, which will apply mutatis mutandis. Section 337 of the Companies Act refers to penalty for frauds by an officer of the Company in which mismanagement has taken place. Likewise, Section 339 refers to any business of the company which has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of that company. Obviously, the persons referred to in Section 339(1) as persons who are other than the parties “to the carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid” which again refers to the business of the company which is being mismanaged and not to the business of another company or other persons. Usha Ananthasubramanian v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 122.
Section 21 of U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982 provides that the management shall not, except with the prior approval of the Board, dismiss any teacher or remove him from service, or serve on him any notice of removal from service, or reduce him in rank or reduce his emoluments or withhold his increment for any period whether temporarily or permanently and any such thing done without such prior approval shall be void.
Section 21 of the U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982, has also been similarly interpreted by the Court in Hem Lata Agrawal v. District Inspector of Schools, 2003 (2) AWC 939. It was held as under: “The question whether the reversion of a teacher, who was appointed on temporary adhoc basis as Principal under Section 18 of the Act would amount to reduction in rank so as to require approval of the Board need not be considered here as whether or not it is a reduction in rank, it is clear that it amounts to reduction of emoluments. The petitioner is entitled to the salary for the post of Principal and reverting her, as a Lecturer would undoubtedly affect the emoluments to which she is entitled. The language of Section 21 of the Act is wide enough to cover within its scope the order impugned in this writ petition.”…. Kapil Deo Prasad V. Joint Director of Education 7th Region Gorakhpur, Writ – A No. – 442 of 2020, decided on 05.03.2020
A wife is not entitled to any Maintenance Allowance from her husband if she is living in adultery or if she has refused to live with her husband without any sufficient reason or if they are living separately by mutual consent. Thus, all the circumstances contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 125, Cr. P.C. presuppose the existence of matrimonial relations. The provision would be applicable where the marriage between the parties subsists and not where it has come to an end. Taking the three circumstances individually, it will be noticed that the first circumstance on account of which a wife is not entitled to claim Maintenance Allowance from her husband is that she is living in adultery. Now, adultery is the sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is married to a third person. This clearly supposes the subsistence of marriage between the husband and wife and if during the subsistence of marriage, the wife lives in adultery, she cannot claim Maintenance Allowance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ashwani K. Lal v. Deepa Kumari Chauhan, Cr.MMO No. 358 of 2016, decided on October 31, 2019
No family is totally devoid of clashes among members constituting it. It is common for elders to scold and sometimes abuse youngsters. Making a daughter in law to do the house hold/domestic work is also not something unusual.
In Narendra v. K. Meena, 2016 (5) KHC 180, it was held as under: “In a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of the son to maintain the parents. If a wife makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and normal custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that and in this case, we do not find any justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the respondent wife. In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are also dependent upon his income. The persistent effort of the respondent wife to constrain the appellant to be separated from the family would be torturous for the husband and in our opinion, the trial court was right when it came to be conclusion that this constitutes an act of ‘cruelty’.” Ranjith P.C. V. Asha Nair P., Mat. Appl. No. 137 of 2014, decided on May 20, 2020
“Recruitment”, “Advertisement”, “Selection” and “Appointment” are different concepts under the service jurisprudence. “Recruitment” is the process of generating a pool of capable people to apply for employment in organization. Selection forms integral part of recruitment process, wherein from amongst eligible candidates, choice is made of person or persons capable to do the job as per the requirement. The process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. “Appointment” is made, after selection process is over, issuance of letter in favour of selected candidates, is an offer to selected candidate to accept the office or position to which he has been selected. On acceptance of the terms and conditions of appointment, the selected candidates on joining has to be accepted as appointed. Ravi Raj v. State of U.P., Writ – A No. – 26584 of 2011, decided on February 7, 2020